September 2026
Social protection data and payment delivery in Africa
Comparing Malawi and Nigeria and reviewing Kenya’s payment system drafts
African Digital Governance CentreFull report and recommendations1 October 2026
Executive summary
ADGC should assess social-protection systems through the complete journey from identification and eligibility to receipt of benefits and effective remedy. A linked record, verified account or processed transaction is an intermediate output. Successful delivery requires evidence that the intended person received the correct benefit, on time, with reasonable access costs.
The sources reviewed support three distinct conclusions. Malawi has documented investment in registries and electronic payments, and a published evaluation provides evidence of household welfare outcomes. Nigeria’s official programme descriptions distinguish a register of potential beneficiaries from programme selection and payment delivery. Kenya’s official draft bill and policy propose broader payment interoperability and stronger consumer protection. These forms of evidence should be assessed separately. [1–8]
This report does not rank the countries or claim that digital integration has caused better welfare outcomes. Comparable independently validated delivery rates were not established from the material reviewed. The recommendations therefore focus on a verifiable delivery chain, independent beneficiary confirmation, accessible grievance handling and transparent performance reporting.
Priority recommendations
Map and reconcile each stage from registry entry to confirmed receipt, including cases that fail or remain pending.
Publish separate measures for eligible-population coverage, payment completion, access costs and grievance remedies.
Provide assisted routes for people facing identity, account, connectivity or disability barriers, subject to lawful verification.
Give one institution responsibility for resolving each payment problem across programme and provider boundaries.
Test the approach in a limited Nigerian pilot before adopting wider implementation targets.
How to use this report
Country findings describe published evidence. Policy implications and recommendations are ADGC analysis. Proposed owners, timelines and indicators are planning suggestions, not government commitments or achieved results.
1 Scope and evidence standard
The review addresses Malawi’s registry-to-payment design as a comparator for Nigeria’s social-protection architecture and examines Kenya’s draft proposals for interoperability and payment redress. The purpose is to identify what Nigeria and ADGC should measure, verify and improve. The evidence cut-off is 1 October 2026.
Source selection
Sources are restricted to official institutional publications: World Bank programme reporting, UNICEF’s published evaluation and annual report, Nigeria’s NASSCO and National Cash Transfer Office descriptions, and Kenya’s National Treasury draft documents. Each factual statement is attributed. An authentic institutional publication verifies what that institution published; it does not automatically establish independent validation of every underlying figure.
Evidence type | What it supports | What it cannot establish alone |
Official draft document | The text and stated objectives of proposed policy or legislation | Enactment, implementation or achieved outcomes |
Programme description | Institutional mandates and the described delivery process | Observed operation or current performance in every location |
Annual results report | Institutionally reported coverage for its reporting period | Correct targeting, full receipt or causal impact |
Published evaluation | Findings within its design, sample and study period | Nationwide payment reliability or effects of untested technical components |
Institutional feature report | Attributed implementation experiences | Representative national rates or audited outcomes |
Limits of this review
This is a document-based policy assessment, not a technical audit, systematic review or field evaluation. Transaction-level records and beneficiary interviews were not available. A September 2026 World Bank results-report catalogue entry for Nigeria was identified, but the full report could not be reviewed; no outcome figures are taken from it. Absence of verified results in this review is not evidence that delivery failed. [9]
Comparison boundaries
Malawi and Nigeria differ in programme scope and institutional arrangements. Kenya’s proposals concern the wider payment ecosystem, rather than a comparable cash-transfer programme. Kenya therefore supplies regulatory lessons; its draft provisions cannot be used as proof of social-protection performance.
2 Malawi findings and implications
Documented delivery design
The World Bank’s June 2023 programme account describes support for Malawi’s Unified Beneficiary Registry and the introduction of harmonised electronic payments under the Social Support for Resilient Livelihoods Project. This establishes that registry and payment investments formed part of the delivery-system design; it does not demonstrate complete integration or universal payment reliability. [1]
Reported coverage
UNICEF’s Annual Report 2024 reports that the Social Cash Transfer Programme reached 381,735 households, representing 1,717,807 people. These are reported programme-coverage figures for 2024. They should not be interpreted as the proportion of all eligible households paid fully and on time, because that denominator and delivery measure are not established by the cited headline figure. [2, printed page 8]
Evaluation evidence
The First Midline Impact Evaluation Report, dated December 2024 and published on UNICEF’s website in July 2025, describes a longitudinal mixed-methods design covering new, continuing, exited and comparison households in Balaka, Dedza and Nkhata Bay. It reports improvements in consumption, food security, financial security and livelihoods for new beneficiaries relative to comparison households. It also reports difficulties maintaining welfare after exit and limited health, nutrition and schooling impacts among new households. These findings concern the programme and study population; the evaluation does not isolate the contribution of registry linkage or electronic payments. [3, executive summary, printed pages xii–xv]
Grievance evidence
UNICEF’s December 2025 feature report describes Malawi’s harmonised grievance mechanism and toll-free social-protection call centre. It reports local experiences of payment delays and forced sharing of benefits. This establishes documented complaints and response channels, but not national resolution, restitution or recurrence rates. [4]
Implications for Nigeria
ADGC’s inference is that Nigeria should study Malawi as a connected delivery and evaluation model, while checking each connection in practice. Registration, selection, payment and complaints should share traceable case identifiers. Welfare evaluation should accompany operational reporting. Programme exits need transparent reasons, accessible appeals and follow-up where vulnerability persists.
Evidence still needed
Request dated interface specifications, reconciled payment-cycle reports, independent confirmation of receipt, cash-out cost surveys and grievance outcomes. Test whether payment failures vary by district, provider or access to identity documentation. These are evidence requests, not findings of failure in Malawi.
3 Nigeria findings and implications
Documented architecture
NASSCO describes the National Social Register as a repository of potential beneficiaries for social-assistance programmes whose eligibility approaches may differ. Its description also identifies State Operations Coordinating Units in registration and a National Beneficiary Register used for cash transfers. The National Cash Transfer Office states that beneficiaries are sourced from the National Social Register. These official descriptions establish a distinction between registration and programme-specific delivery. [5–6]
What the comparison establishes
The documents support examining the hand-offs between state registration, the national register, programme selection and payment. They do not support a claim that every eligible Nigerian household is registered, that every registered household qualifies for a particular programme, or that all selected households receive payments. Nigeria’s architecture should therefore be evaluated through separate cohorts and dated status changes.
Current outcome evidence
No current independently corroborated national payment-success rate is presented. The World Bank catalogue identifies a September 2026 Implementation Status and Results Report for the National Social Safety Net Program Scale Up, but its full contents were unavailable for review. The earlier brief’s administrative payment totals are excluded from this report’s findings. [9]
Proposed delivery model
ADGC recommends a traceable sequence: household registration; programme-specific eligibility decision; beneficiary enrolment; lawful identity and account verification; payment authorisation; provider settlement; beneficiary access; and remedy where needed. This is a proposed analytical model, not a claim that Nigeria currently operates a single integrated system with all these stages.
Data governance requirements
Before implementing additional data exchanges, identify the lawful purpose, accountable institution and minimum fields needed at each stage. Define correction procedures, access controls, retention periods and audit records. Avoid making unrelated personal data available merely because systems can exchange it. Validate the legal and operational arrangements with the relevant Nigerian authorities.
Priority verification questions
Which institution owns each hand-off? How frequently are records updated? Can eligible households request reassessment? How are identity mismatches resolved? Are payment status codes reconciled with bank or wallet records? Can a household challenge exclusion or an incorrect payment? These questions should be answered with documents and sampled case records before architecture choices are endorsed.
4 Kenya draft review and implications
Status and interoperability proposals
Kenya’s National Treasury publishes the National Payment System Bill 2026 and National Payment System Policy for public participation. They are treated here as drafts. Clause 28 of the bill proposes interoperable systems for payment service providers and system operators, including compatibility with other providers, operators and agents; it also addresses Central Bank approval of interoperability arrangements. [7, printed pages 24–25]
Policy proposals on standards and redress
The draft policy proposes technical standards and API specifications, open API and messaging standards, and compliance audits. It identifies failed, delayed, erroneous and unauthorised transactions across institutions as consumer-protection challenges, and proposes complaints-handling, dispute-resolution, liability and fraud-prevention frameworks. These are policy proposals, not evidence that enforceable operational remedies already exist under the drafts. [8, printed pages 22–23, 26 and 30]
Assessment of the proposals
ADGC’s assessment is that interoperability and redress should be designed together. Connecting providers expands the number of institutions involved in a payment. Users need a clear route to remedy even when the originating programme, sending provider, receiving provider and agent are different organisations. Technical compatibility alone does not specify who investigates, refunds or compensates.
Recommended implementation questions
Identify the scope and timetable of required connectivity; admission and compliance rules; service availability and failure handling; transparent charges; and data-security obligations. Separately establish complaint acknowledgement and resolution deadlines, responsibility for tracing a failed transfer, treatment of disputed authorisation, refund rules and independent escalation. Do not assume these details are settled merely because the policy names a future framework.
Recommended tests
Test payments across provider pairs and include reversals, duplicate instructions, outages, incorrect destinations and delayed settlements. Include low-value transactions and users requiring assisted access. Assess whether a complaint produces a practical remedy, not just a closed ticket. These are recommended tests, not documented results for Kenya.
Relevance to Nigeria
Nigeria can use the drafts as a regulatory comparison when defining payment-provider contracts, technical interfaces and beneficiary protections. Adoption of a Kenyan proposal should depend on Nigerian law and operational needs. ADGC should make no claim that Kenya’s draft model has already improved benefit delivery.
5 Comparative delivery scorecard
The following indicators are proposed for assessment and pilot use. Targets should be set only after establishing a reliable baseline. Report values by payment cycle and cohort, and distinguish households, people, accounts and transactions.
Area | Technical measure | Delivery measure and denominator |
Coverage | Valid registry records and update dates | Eligible households enrolled divided by estimated eligible households; disclose estimation method |
Linkage | Identity and account match rates | Eligible cases delayed or excluded by unresolved verification barriers |
Payment | Instructions accepted and settlements reconciled | Households receiving full entitlement by due date divided by households due payment |
Completion | Unique transaction identifiers and reconciled statuses | Households receiving every due instalment divided by households due the complete schedule |
Access | Provider and agent availability | Recipient costs, travel time, waiting time and ability to use or withdraw funds |
Remedy | Tickets logged, assigned and closed | Substantiated cases remedied within agreed time; money restored and recipient confirmation |
Equity | Disaggregated administrative records | Differences in delivery by location, sex, disability and access barriers, where lawfully measured |
Welfare | Linked evaluation sample | Consumption, food security and welfare indicators evaluated with an appropriate comparison design |
Verification protocol
Reconcile programme authorisations with provider records, then confirm receipt in a probability-based sample where feasible. Include failed and pending cases in sampling; contacting only successful recipients creates a biased view. Record non-response and inaccessible households. Distinguish a credited account from funds that a beneficiary could actually access.
Reporting safeguards
Publish aggregate results with definitions, dates, missing-data rates and confidence intervals where appropriate. Explain whether a figure is administrative, independently validated or evaluation-based. Protect personal information. Do not combine records linked and beneficiaries paid into one success percentage.
6 Recommendations and implementation plan
Recommendation 1 Establish accountable hand offs
For Nigeria, begin with a documented responsibility map agreed with programme agencies, state units and payment providers. Assign ownership of data correction, eligibility decisions, payment reconciliation and remedy. Require a traceable case identifier and clear reasons for pending, rejected and completed states. ADGC should facilitate the mapping rather than assume control of government systems.
Recommendation 2 Measure receipt and access
Require routine reporting of full and timely receipt, schedule completion and recipient access costs alongside technical outputs. Commission independent checks that include difficult and failed cases. Use an external evaluator or qualified verification team where feasible; establish sampling and reporting rules before results are known.
Recommendation 3 Provide accessible correction and appeal
Offer assisted enrolment and complaint routes, including channels usable without a smartphone. Establish procedures for identity discrepancies and account problems. Any alternative verification route must remain lawful and auditable. Provide reasons for exclusion and programme exit, accessible appeals, and reassessment when circumstances change.
Recommendation 4 Make payment remedy operational
Provider contracts should specify investigation ownership, traceability, escalation and remedies for failed or erroneous payments. A beneficiary should not need to coordinate several institutions to obtain an answer. Publish service standards after legal review and operational agreement; do not invent national statutory deadlines.
Recommendation 5 Link operations with evaluation
Maintain operational dashboards and commission periodic welfare evaluation as separate activities. Examine whether transfer value, timing and programme exit affect outcomes. Avoid attributing welfare gains to technology without a design capable of testing that relationship.
Proposed period | ADGC activity | Reviewable output |
First 30 days | Verify mandates and obtain programme documents, data dictionaries and payment rules | Evidence inventory, delivery map and list of unresolved questions |
Days 31 to 60 | Agree a limited pilot, lawful data arrangements and baseline indicators | Pilot protocol, responsibility matrix and verification plan |
Days 61 to 90 | Review one or more payment cycles and sampled beneficiary cases | Reconciliation findings, access-cost assessment and grievance analysis |
After pilot review | Assess results and resource needs before expansion | Recommendations with evidence, costs, owners and decision gates |
These periods are indicative planning windows. Implementation depends on agency participation, lawful access to data, procurement and resources. Expansion should follow demonstrated delivery improvements and resolved access barriers, rather than growth in registry size alone.
7 Conclusion and sources
The defensible conclusion is that social-protection architecture should be judged through both system operation and beneficiary experience. Malawi supplies published programme and evaluation evidence; Nigeria supplies official descriptions of registry and delivery functions; Kenya supplies draft regulatory proposals. None of these sources, on its own, establishes a complete comparable national delivery-success rate.
ADGC’s immediate contribution should be an evidence-led verification framework for Nigeria, supported by clear responsibility at every stage and independent confirmation of receipt and remedy. Where evidence is incomplete, the report should state the gap rather than turn programme ambitions or administrative outputs into claims of success.
Sources and evidence status
[1] World Bank. Restoring Hope and Improving Livelihoods Among Poor Households in Malawi Through Social Cash Transfers. 27 June 2023. Institutional feature; supports historical design description.
[2] UNICEF Malawi. Annual Report 2024. Printed page 8. Primary annual report; coverage figures are institutionally reported.
[3] UNICEF. Malawi Social Cash Transfer Programme First Midline Impact Evaluation Report. December 2024; publication page dated July 2025. Executive summary, printed pages xii–xv. Evaluation findings are limited to its design and study population.
[4] UNICEF Malawi. Toll free line tackling social cash transfer complaints. 26 December 2025. Institutional feature; local accounts, not national audit results.
[5] NASSCO. Learn more about the National Social Register. Undated official programme description.
[6] National Cash Transfer Office. ESR CT registration. Undated official programme description; establishes stated beneficiary source.
[7] Kenya National Treasury. Draft National Payment System Bill 2026. Public participation draft. Clause 28, printed pages 24–25.
[8] Kenya National Treasury. Draft National Payment System Policy. August 2026. Printed pages 22–23, 26 and 30. Draft proposals only.
[9] World Bank. National Social Safety Net Program Scale Up P176935. Implementation Status and Results Report, Sequence 9. Catalogue dated 11 September 2026. Catalogue identified; full contents not reviewed and no results used.
Comments